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An axiomatic system for STIT imagination logic
Grigory K. Olkhovikov
Abstract. We formulate a Hilbert-style axiomatic system for STIT logic
of imagination recently proposed by H. Wansing in [2] and prove its com-
pleteness by the method of canonical models.
Keywords: STIT logic, logic of imagination, canonical models, complete-
ness, axiomatization
We assume a propositional language with a countably infinite set V ar of proposi-
tional variables and the following set of modalities:
(1) SA understood as ‘A is settled true’; the dual modality is PA understood ‘A is
possible’.
(2) [c]aA understood as ‘agent a cstit-realizes A’; the other action modality, namely,
[d]aA to be read ‘agent a dstit-realizes A’, is in this setting a defined one with the
following definition: [c]aA ∧ ¬SA.
(3) IaA understood as ‘agent a imagines that A’.
Among other things, all the agent indices are assumed to stand for pairwise different
agents.
For these modalities we assume the following ‘stit-plus-neighborhood’ semantics
originally defined by H. Wansing in [2].
An imagination model is a tuple M = 〈Tree,≤, Ag, Choice, {Na | a ∈ Ag}, V 〉,
where:
• Tree is a non-empty set of moments, and ≤ is a partial order on Tree such that
∀m1,m2∃m(m ≤ m1 ∧m ≤ m2),
and
∀m1,m2,m((m1 ≤ m ∧m2 ≤ m)→ (m1 ≤ m2 ∨m2 ≤ m1)).
• The set History of all histories of M is then just a set of all maximal ≤-chains
in Tree. A history h is said to pass through a moment m iff m ∈ h. The set of
all histories passing through m ∈ Tree is denoted by Hm.
• Ag is a finite set of all agents acting in Tree and is assumed to be disjoint from
all the other items in M.
• Choice is a function defined on the set Tree × Ag, such that for an arbitrary
〈m, a〉 ∈ Tree × Ag, we the value of this function, that is to say Choice(m, a)
(more commonly denoted Choicema ) is a partition of Hm. If h ∈ Hm, then
Choicema (h) denotes the element of Choice
m
a , to which h belongs. In the special
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case when we have Choicema = {Hm}, it is said that the agent a has a vacuous
choice at the momentm. In our models, Choice is assumed to satisfy the following
two restrictions:
– “No choice between undivided histories”: for arbitrary m ∈ Tree, a ∈ Ag,
e ∈ Choicema , and h, h
′ ∈ Hm:
(h ∈ e ∧ ∃m′(m < m′ ∧m′ ∈ h ∩ h′))→ h′ ∈ e.
– “Independence of agents”. If f is a function defined on Ag such that
∀a ∈ Ag(f(a) ∈ Choiceam), then
⋂
a∈Ag f(a) 6= ∅.
• The set of moment-history pairs in M, that is to say, the set
MH(M) = {〈m,h〉 | m ∈ Tree, h ∈ Hm}
is then to be used as a set of points, where formulas are evaluated.
• For every a ∈ Ag, we haveNa :MH(M)→ 2(2
MH(M)). Na is thus a neighborhood
function, defining, for every moment history pair m/h the set of propositions
imagined by the agent a at the moment m in history h.
• V is an evaluation function for atomic sentences, that is to say, V : V ar→ 2MH(M).
The relation of satisfaction of sentences in the above defined language by moment-
history pairs in M is then defined inductively as follows:
M,m/h  p⇔ m/h ∈ V (p), for atomic p;
M,m/h  (A ∧B)⇔M,m/h  A ∧M,m/h  B;
M,m/h  ¬A⇔M,m/h 6 A;
M,m/h  SA⇔ ∀h′ ∈ Hm(M,m/h
′  A);
M,m/h  [c]aA⇔ ∀h
′ ∈ Choicema (h)(M,m/h
′  A);
M,m/h  IaA⇔ ∀h
′ ∈ Choicema (h)({m/h ∈MH(M) | M,m/h  A} ∈ Na(m/h
′))∧
∧ ∃h′′ ∈ Hm(({m/h ∈MH(M) | M,m/h  A} /∈ Na(m/h
′′))).
For this logic we propose the following axiomatization:
(A0) Propositional tautologies.
(A1) S is an S5 modality.
(A2) For every a ∈ Ag, [c]a is an S5 modality.
(A3) SA→ [c]aA for every a ∈ Ag.
(A4) (P [c]a1A1∧ . . .∧P [c]anAn)→ P ([c]a1A1 ∧ . . .∧ [c]anAn), provided that all the
a1 . . . an are pairwise different.
(A5) IaA→ ([c]aIaA ∧ ¬SIaA) for every a ∈ Ag.
Rules are as follows:
(R1) Modus ponens.
(R2) From A infer SA.
(R3) From A↔ B infer IaA↔ IaB for every a ∈ Ag.
Note. Thus the proposed axiomatization is just the axiomatization of dstit logic
proposed by Ming Xu plus axiomatization of the logic of Ia as a minimal neighborhood
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modal system E plus the special axiom (A5) stating the action character of the imag-
ination operator. Note also that the converse of (A5) easily follows from (A2), so that
we actually have a biconditional here.
Our aim now is to get a strong completeness theorem for this system L with respect
to the above semantics, in the following form: if Θ is an L-consistent set of sentences,
then Θ has a model in your proposed semantics.
In what follows we will always use ‘consistency’ to mean ‘L-consistency’ and we let
⊢ stand for a relation of L-derivability.
In order to get the main theorem, we use the technique of canonical models, which
is an adaptation of the corresponding techniques for the two respective parts of our
system as mentioned in the Note above. In particular, we draw on [1, ch. 17] in many
matters relevant to the purely STIT part of the following construction.
More precisely, we let W to be the set of all L-maxiconsistent sets of sentences and
we denote the members of W as w, w′, w1 etc. We set wRw
′ iff {A | SA ∈ w} ⊆ w′,
and we set w ≃a w′ iff {A | [c]aA ∈ w} ⊆ w′. By standard modal logic, (A1) and (A2)
ensure that all these relations are relations of equivalence; moreover, (A3) ensures that
≃a⊆ R for every a ∈ Ag.
Indeed, let w ≃a w′ and let SA ∈ w. By (A3) and maxiconsistency of w, we get
[c]aA ∈ w, whence by w ≃a w
′ we get that A ∈ w′. Since A was arbitrary, this means
that wRw′.
In what follows, we will be denoting equivalence classes of W with respect to R by
X , X ′, X1, etc. The set of all such equivalence classes will be denoted by Ξ. When
restricted to an arbitrary X ∈ Ξ, the relation R turns into a universal relation, but
relations of the form ≃a can remain non-trivial equivalences breaking X up into several
equivalence classes. We will denote the family of equivalence classes corresponding to
≃a↾ X by E(X, a).
Among the elements of W , we have a special interest in the maxiconsistent sets
extending the following set of formulas:
Σ = {¬p | p ∈ V ar} ∪ {SA↔ A | for arbitrary A} ∪ {[c]aA↔ A | for arbitrary A}.
The following facts are worth noting:
(F1) There exists exactly one element in W , which extends Σ. We will denote this
element by w. Indeed, one easily sees that Σ pre-determines every Boolean formula
by fixing the literals. The modalities S and [c]a are then just vacuous in virtue of the
definition of Σ. Finally, every maxiconsistent set extending Σ will have to contain ¬IaA
for every formula A and every a ∈ Ag. For suppose otherwise. Then for some w ∈ W
such that Σ ⊆ w, for some formula A and for some a ∈ Ag we will have IaA ∈ w. Then,
by (A5) and maxiconsistency of w we will get ¬SIaA ∈ w. Therefore, by definition of
Σ and maxiconsistency of w, we will get ¬IaA ∈ w, which contradicts the assumption
that w ∈ W . Therefore, the statements with Ia-modalities are also fixed for every
w ∈W , for which Σ ⊆ w. It is also easy to see that such a maxiconsistent w extending
Σ must exist, since Σ itself is obviously consistent1
(F2) It follows from the definitions of Σ and R that the R-equivalence set containing
w, contains w only. We will denote this equivalence set by X.
1Σ is satisfiable and thus consistent. Indeed, consider a model consisting of a single moment, where
every agent has a vacuous choice, every set of imagination neighborhoods is empty and every variable
valuation is empty as well.
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We now proceed to the definition of our canonical model. First, we choose2 an
element 0 /∈ Ξ ∪W and define our set of moments:
Tree = {0} ∪ Ξ ∪W.
We then set the following partial order on Tree. For arbitrary x, y ∈ Tree we have
x ≤ y iff x = y, or y ∈ x or x = 0. This allows for a simple description of the set of
histories in our frame. Every history turns out to have the form hw = 〈0, X,w〉, where
X ∈ Ξ and w ∈ X . Thus, our set of histories is in one-to-one correspondence with W .
Thirdly, we define the choice function. It assigns a vacuous choice to every agent at
every moment m, if m /∈ Ξ. That is to say, the only choice of every agent at every such
moment will be just the set of all histories passing through this moment. Otherwise,
i.e. for the case when m = X ∈ Ξ, we define the choice function as follows:
ChoiceaX = {H | ∃e ∈ E(X, a)(H = {hw | w ∈ e})}.
Next, we need to define the imagination neighborhoods. We do this in the following
way. Na(m/h) = ∅ for every a ∈ Ag and every m /∈ Ξ. For the case when m = X ∈ Ξ,
we need one further auxiliary notion. For every sentence A we set Ext(A) (read:
extension of A) to be {X/hw | w ∈ X ∧ A ∈ w} if A /∈ w; otherwise we set
Ext(A) = {X/hw | w ∈ X ∧ A ∈ w} ∪ {m/hw | m /∈ Ξ ∧m ∈ hw}.
Having defined the extensions, we set
Na(X/hw) = {Ext(A) | IaA ∈ w}
for arbitrary w ∈ X ∈ Ξ.
Finally, we define the evaluation function for variables in the following way:
V (p) = {X/hw | w ∈ X ∈ Ξ ∧ p ∈ w}.
We need to show that the canonical model M defined above is the model of our
logic. The semantic restrictions are mostly seen to hold immediately; in particular, the
no-choice-between-undivided-histories restriction holds because we only have undivided
histories at the moment 0, where only vacuous choices are allowed. The only exception
is the independence-of-agents restriction, which we treat below.
Lemma 1 (On Independence). Let m ∈ Tree and let f be a function on Ag such that
∀a ∈ Ag(f(a) ∈ Choiceam). Then
⋂
a∈Ag f(a) 6= ∅.
Proof. If m /∈ Ξ, then the statement of the Lemma is obvious, since every agent will
have a vacuous choice. We treat the case, when m = X ∈ Ξ. Consider a func-
tion f as described in Lemma. For every f(a) we fix ef(a) ∈ E(X, a) such that
f(a) = {hw | w ∈ ef(a)} and we fix, further, an arbitrary wf(a) ∈ ef(a). Since ef(a) is
an ≃a-equivalence class, there is a set Γf(a) of sentences of the form [c]aA shared by
all the members of ef(a) and only those members. Also, since X is an R-equivalence
2We also assume, with the view of the definition of ≤ below, that 0 is not an element of any element
of Ξ ∪W .
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class, there is a set ∆ of sentences of the form SA shared by all (and only) members
of X . Consider, then, the following set of sentences:
Λ = (
⋃
a∈Ag
Γf(a)) ∪∆.
We claim that Λ is consistent. Assume otherwise. In this case Λ contains a finite
inconsistent subset. Given that S and [c]a are S5-modalities, we can assume that this
inconsistent subset has the following form:
SB, [c]a1A1, . . . , [c]anAn,
where all the a1 . . . an are pairwise different (and moreover, Ag = {a1 . . . an}). We
know, further, that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have SB, [c]aiAi ∈ wf(ai). So, choose an
arbitrary w ∈ X . For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n we have wf(ai)Rw, therefore, we must also
have P [c]aiAi ∈ w for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Indeed, if it were otherwise, we would have
S¬[c]aiAi ∈ w since w is maxiconsistent. But then, given that wRwf(ai), we would
have ¬[c]aiAi ∈ wf(ai), a contradiction.
Thus, we have in fact that
P [c]a1A1 ∧ . . . ∧ P [c]anAn ∈ w,
therefore, by (A4), we also have
P ([c]a1A1 ∧ . . . ∧ [c]anAn) ∈ w.
This, in turn, means that the set
{A | SA ∈ ∆} ∪ {[c]a1A1 ∧ . . . ∧ [c]anAn}
is consistent: otherwise, we would have that
{A | SA ∈ ∆} ⊢ ¬([c]a1A1 ∧ . . . ∧ [c]anAn),
and, by standard modal S5-reasoning, that
∆ ⊢ S¬([c]a1A1 ∧ . . . ∧ [c]anAn),
which, given that w ∈ X and hence ∆ ⊆ w, would mean inconsistency of w, a contra-
diction.
Therefore, we may choose an arbitrary maxiconsistentw′ extending {A | SA ∈ ∆}∪{[c]a1A1∧. . .∧[c]anAn},
and by the fact that this set contains {A | SA ∈ ∆} we know that wRw′ and thus
w′ ∈ X and further SB ∈ w′. This means that our finite subset in fact has a model
and is not inconsistent. Therefore, since the finite set was arbitrary, Λ is consistent
as well. Consider, then, an arbitrary maxiconsistent w′′ extending Λ. Since ∆ ⊆ w′′,
we have w′′ ∈ X , and since Γf(a) ⊆ w
′′ for arbitrary a ∈ Ag, we have w′′ ≃a wf(a)
for every such a. This means, in turn, that w′′ ∈ ef(a) for every a ∈ Ag, and so
hw′′ ∈
⋂
a∈Ag f(a) 6= ∅.
By now, the only ingredient to be added is the Truth Lemma; we divide it into two
parts as follows.
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Lemma 2 (Truth Lemma 1). Let m /∈ Ξ and m ∈ h. Then, for any sentence A, the
following holds:
M,m/h  A⇔ A ∈ w.
Proof. We use induction on the construction of A. If A = p ∈ V ar, then A /∈ w, and
also m/h /∈ V (A), since m /∈ Ξ. Therefore, M,m/h 6 A.
The boolean cases are then trivial.
If A = SB, then M,m/h  A iff M,m/h′  B for every h′ such that m ∈ h′ iff
A ∈ w by induction hypothesis (since we have proved IH for arbitrary h going through
m).
If A = [c]aB, then M,m/h  A iff M,m/h
′  B for every h′ such that m ∈ h′
and h′ ∈ Choiceam(h) iff A ∈ w by induction hypothesis (cf. the commentary on the
previous case).
If A = IaB, then A /∈ w by (F1). We also have M,m/h 6 A, since, given that
m /∈ Ξ, all the choices at m are vacuous.
Lemma 3 (Truth Lemma 2). Let X ∈ Ξ and w ∈ X. Then, for any sentence A, the
following holds:
M, X/hw  A⇔ A ∈ w.
Proof. Again, we use induction on the construction of A. Atomic case we have by
definition of V , and the boolean cases are obvious. We consider the modal cases.
Let A = SB, and assume that SB ∈ w. Then take any hw′ passing through X . In
the context ofM this means that w′ ∈ X , which in turn means that wRw′. Therefore,
we have B ∈ w′ and, by induction hypothesis,M, X/hw′  B. Since hw′ was arbitrary,
this means that M, X/hw  SB.
On the other hand, assume that SB /∈ w. This means that the set
α = {C | SC ∈ w} ∪ {¬B}
is consistent. Indeed, otherwise we would have
{C | SC ∈ w} ⊢ B,
and further, by standard S5 reasoning
{SC | SC ∈ w} ⊢ SB,
and so, given, maxiconsistency of w, we would have SB ∈ w, contrary to our as-
sumption. Therefore, consider an arbitrary w′ ∈ W extending α. By definition,
w′ ∈ X , therefore hw′ goes through X and we have, by induction hypothesis, that
M, X/hw′ 6 B.
Let A = [c]aB, and let [c]aB ∈ w. Then take any hw′ such that hw′ ∈ ChoiceaX(hw).
In the context of M this means that w ≃a w′. Therefore, we have B ∈ w′ and,
by induction hypothesis, M, X/hw′  B. Since hw′ was arbitrary, this means that
M, X/hw  [c]aB.
On the other hand, assume that [c]aB /∈ w. This means that the set
β = {C | [c]aC ∈ w} ∪ {¬B}
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is consistent. Indeed, otherwise we would have
{C | [c]aC ∈ w} ⊢ B,
and further, by standard S5 reasoning
{[c]aC | [c]aC ∈ w} ⊢ [c]aB,
and so, given, maxiconsistency of w, we would have [c]aB ∈ w, contrary to our assump-
tion. Therefore, consider an arbitrary w′ ∈ W extending β. By definition, w′ ≃a w,
and also w′ ∈ X given that ≃a⊆ R. Therefore hw′ goes through X and moreover
hw′ ∈ ChoiceaX(hw). By induction hypothesis, we have that M, X/hw′ 6 B, and so,
putting all together, that M, X/hw 6 [c]aB
Let A = IaB. First of all, note that by induction hypothesis and Lemma 2 we have
the following biconditional:
Ext(B) = {m/h | M,m/h  B}. (1)
Now, assume that IaB ∈ w. Then, by (A5), we also have [c]aIaB ∈ w and
¬SIaB ∈ w. Take any hw′ such that hw′ ∈ ChoiceaX(hw). In the context of M
this means that w ≃a w
′. Therefore, we have IaB ∈ w
′. By definition of Na, this
means that Ext(B) ∈ Na(X/hw′). On the other hand, the fact that ¬SIaB ∈ w means
that the set
γ = {C | SC ∈ w} ∪ {¬IaB}
is consistent. Indeed, otherwise we would have
{C | SC ∈ w} ⊢ IaB,
and further, by standard S5 reasoning
{SC | SC ∈ w} ⊢ SIaB,
and so, given, maxiconsistency of w, we would have SIaB ∈ w, contrary to our assump-
tion. Therefore, consider an arbitrary w′′ ∈ W extending γ. By definition, w′′ ∈ X so
that hw′′ goes through X , and we have Ext(B) /∈ Na(X/hw′′) by definition of Na.
Putting all this together, we get that, by (1), {m/h | M,m/h  B} ∈ Na(X/hw′)
for every hw′ ∈ Choice
a
X(hw) and {m/h | M,m/h  B} /∈ Na(X/hw′′) for some hw′
going through X . That is to say, we get that M, X/hw  IaB.
On the other hand, if IaB /∈ w, then, of course, Ext(B) /∈ Na(X/hw), and given the
fact that hw ∈ Choice
a
X(hw) and the biconditional (1), we get that M, X/hw 6 IaB
immediately.
Now we are ready for our main result.
Theorem 1. Let Θ be a consistent set of sentences. Then Θ has a model.
Proof. Consider any maxiconsistent setw extending Θ and its correspondingR-equivalence
class X . Then, by Lemma 3, we have M, X/hw  Θ.
We also get compactness of L as a standard consequence of strong completeness.
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